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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Rising levels of debt and debt servicing, falling rates of investment, declining 
growth rates of output and employment, and sharp increase in poverty sum up the 
disappointing performance of Pakistan’s economy over the last decade.  By the end of the 
fiscal year 2001, external debt had increased to $30 billion, and the ratio of external debt 
and the present value of debt servicing stood at 64.0 and 80.0 percent of GDP 
respectively. Even though the ratio of debt servicing to export earnings and debt servicing 
to total foreign exchange earnings have declined because of debt rescheduling, still they 
were 37.4 and 23.3 percent, respectively, in 2000-01. Prior to debt rescheduling, the two 
ratios were 55.4 and 34.9 percent in 1997-98. The average growth rate of GDP has been 
less than 4 percent, with a declining trend, and unemployment rate has increased from 
less than 5 percent to 7.8 percent over the last decade. The real wages have fallen, and 
one-third of the population is unable to meet its nutritional requirements. While a number 
of factors including the inconsistency of the economic policies of successive 
governments, Structural Adjustment and Stabilisation Programmes of the IMF, and 
corruption have been responsible for this state of affairs, debt accumulation to alarming 
proportions is also a major cause of such performance.  
The debt problem has been haunting the policy-makers for about a decade. 
The present government appointed a Debt Reduction and Management Committee 
early in 2000; it submitted its report in March 2001 [Pakistan (2001)]. The Report 
called for early resolution of the debt problem because it could otherwise slow 
down the growth rate further, increase inflation, destabilise the currency, and 
adversely impact the flow of trade and technology. The Report recommends 
revival of growth, reduction in the future borrowing, bringing down of the real cost 
of borrowing, divestiture of the assets, improving the effectiveness of the 
government expenditure, and improving the carrying capacity through growth in 
revenues, exports, remittances and other foreign receipts for resolution of the 
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problem.  It also came up with a short-term strategy, which called for rescheduling 
of $5.1 billion of debt payments. Whereas the recommendations of the Report for 
the resolution of debt problem need to be firmed up with strong action 
programmes, some of the actions taken by the government in recent past are a 
move towards that direction. The $12.5 billion worth of rescheduling of debts 
implies that the short-run problem has been resolved.  
How the debt crisis impacts growth and poverty has been widely discussed in 
the literature [For example, see Williamson (1989); Ahmed and Summers (1992); 
Fishlow (1985) and Lustig (1999)]. Whenever the debt crisis assumes significant 
proportions, the resource inflows dry up and there is a negative transfer of resources 
from the debtor countries. The investment tends to fall as the debt rises beyond safe 
limits, investible resources fall due to sharp increase in the debt servicing, investors 
lose confidence, demand falls to low levels, interest rates start rising, and there is a 
massive capital flight.  
With a view to financing debt-servicing, the government has to increase taxes. 
If taxes are imposed on capital or the income received from it, investment tends to 
fall. Alternatively, if the taxes are imposed on the goods consumed by the poor, real 
incomes of the poor are reduced. Similarly, if the public expenditures are reduced, 
especially the development and the social sector expenditures the poor are impacted 
adversely. All three ways imply an increase in poverty.  
How the debt got accumulated, why it became difficult to service the debt, 
and to what extent debt overhang and the mechanism through which it has affected 
the poverty levels in Pakistan are examined in the present study.  The process and 
trends of debt accumulation in Pakistan are examined in Section II.  The use of loans 
and impact on the economy of Pakistan are examined in Section III.  The process 
through which debt accumulation has impacted the poor adversely has been analysed 
in Section IV. Debt restructuring and the impact of debt rescheduling are discussed 
in Section V. Major conclusions are summarised in the last section of the study. 
 
II.  THE PROCESS AND TRENDS IN DEBT ACCUMULATION 
The high and continued level of fiscal and balance-of-payments deficits has 
been responsible for the sharp growth in external debt. While almost one-third of the 
budgetary deficit has been financed by foreign aid, the balance-of-payments deficits 
have been financed mostly by borrowing rather than by foreign private investment. 
Since the balance-of-payments deficit in most of the years in the 1990s has exceeded 
$2 billion, the debt outstanding at present has gone up to $30 billion despite regular 
servicing of debt. 
Because of the unsustainable levels of budgetary and balance-of-payments 
deficits, Pakistan has implemented various Structural and Stabilisation Programmes 
of the IMF and the World Bank since 1987-88 but only very few have been fully The Presidential Address 
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implemented. The fiscal deficit, therefore, continued to be in the range of 6 to 7 
percent of GDP
1 and the balance-of-payments deficit, instead of falling, increased 
and peaked at $4,575 million in 1995-96, and for the last couple of years it has been 
around two billion dollars.  
The recent difficulties in servicing the debt suggest that external debt is not in 
the tolerable limits.  Siddiqui and Malik (2002) present eight different indicators and 
all of these suggest that debt
2 in Pakistan is significantly higher than the average of 
South Asia and the least-developed countries.  For example, debt to export ratio in 
1997 in Pakistan was 342.9 percent as compared to 174.5 percent of South Asia and 
141.0 percent in the LDCs.  Debt to GDP ratio in Pakistan was 58.3 percent as 
compared to 28.4 percent in South Asia and 40.5 percent in the LDCs; and the ratio 
of debt servicing to exports in Pakistan was 28.3 percent as compared to 15.3 of 
South Asia and 4.3 percent in the LDCs. All the indicators point to the severity of the 
problem Pakistan is facing.
3 Nevertheless, Chaudhary and Anwar (2002), using debt 
Laffer curve, show that Pakistan’s debt is not so high that the creditors could write 
off at least a part of the debt and would also gain in the process. This indicates that 
Pakistan has the potential to pay the debt; it is only illiquid and qualifies for debt 
rescheduling but not a write-off.  Nevertheless, like any other developing country, 
Pakistan welcomes any debt write-off and as a matter of fact half a billion dollars of 
Pakistan’s debt has also been written off.  
The external debt problem has been compounded during the last decade because 
of the increasing reliance on short/medium-term financing to meet external obligations. 
The sharp increase in debt servicing is essentially due to changes in the term structure 
of the debt. For example, in FY96-97, short/medium-term debt represented about 18 
percent of Pakistan’s external liability and accounted for over 55 percent of the debt 
servicing cost.  Debt-servicing accounted for as much as 62.1 percent of the total 
exports and 46.0 percent of the total foreign exchange earnings in 1996-97.     
 
III.   FOREIGN CAPITAL INFLOWS AND THEIR 
      CONTRIBUTION TO GROWTH RATE 
Whereas each of the successive governments has called for self-reliant 
growth, they all have invariably relied on foreign aid to finance a significant 
proportion of investment in the short run.  It was expected that by raising the levels 
of investment and output foreign aid would result in higher levels of savings, and 
 
1In 2001, however, the budgetary deficit declined to 5.2 percent of GDP. 
2Debt as a proportion of exports, Debt–GDP ratio, total debt servicing as a percentage of exports, 
interest payments as a percentage of exports, reserves to debt ratio, short-term to total debt, concessional 
debt to total debt, and multilateral debt to total debt. 
3Nevertheless, there are a large number of countries whose debt exceeds even that of Pakistan.  
On the basis of some indicators, even in South Asia there are some countries whose debt exceeds that of 
Pakistan.  A. R. Kemal 
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rising export levels would ensure that the foreign capital inflow may not be required 
to fill the resource and trade gaps in the long run (See the 3rd and 6th Five-Year 
Plans). However, governments hardly made any serious effort to mobilise resources 
and their budgets continued to be in deficit, and the resource and trade gaps widened, 
thus increasing the dependence on foreign capital even further. The increase in debt 
servicing has resulted in a further reduction in the investible resources. To meet the 
debt servicing obligations, the governments engaged in short-term borrowing, and 
that compounded the debt-servicing problems. 
No doubt, foreign capital enables investment levels to rise beyond those that 
can be financed by domestic savings. In the absence of capital inflows, a growth rate 
exceeding 4 percent at the existing savings rates of Pakistan is difficult to conceive. 
However, while foreign aid is expected to generate higher levels of investment and 
GDP, such expectations may not materialise if foreign capital is not channelled into 
productive economic activities, and is used instead for higher levels of public or 
private consumption. Obviously if no assets are created corresponding to the foreign 
capital inflows, it results in lower level of savings and growth in the long run. 
Moreover, foreign aid also influences the choice of projects and technologies and can 
have adverse income distribution and employment effects. 
The debt crisis emerges because the loans are not properly utilised. There are 
at least four major reasons for improper use of loans, viz., the donor’s agenda; 
corruption; capital flight; and the adverse impact of loans on the domestic savings. 
Whereas the donor agencies play an important role in economic development by 
providing the requisite finances, they also influence the policies and agenda of the 
government through their choice of projects and technology, programmes, economic 
strategy, and consequently, the levels of efficiency, employment, poverty, and 
income distribution. That sovereignty is compromised has been extensively analysed.  
For example, see Corbo and Suh (1992); Jain and Bongorals (1994); Banuri, Khan, 
and Mahmood (1997); Kemal (1994); Killick (1995); Park (1995); Mcgillivary et al. 
(1995); Morrissey (1995); Pasha (1995); Cameron (1995); Tetzlaff (1995) and 
Reiger (1995).  Tying of aid to sources and to certain projects reduces utility of the 
aid, and it may not generate sufficient output and exports for debt repayment. 
Corruption is widespread and a substantial part of the resources earmarked for 
development projects are misused [World Bank (2001)]. The widespread corruption 
in Pakistan is well-reflected in the large number of cases being investigated by the 
National Accountability Bureau. We may note that a part of the money obtained 
through corrupt practices is used in conspicuous consumption, while the remaining 
money leaves the country.  
Dornbusch (1985) and Ize and Ortiz (1986) argue that currency over-
valuation, threat of devaluation, and increasing domestic financial instability result in 
capital flight. While these are important issues in capital flight, there are many other 
motives that lead to capital flight. For example, the corruption money may leave the The Presidential Address 
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country to avoid any accountability, because the corrupt feel that such money is safer 
abroad. Similarly, the domestic producers may use foreign resources to fund 
domestic investment and invest their own resources abroad even if the return is lower 
outside the country, as long as they earn more than the cost of funds. Moreover, 
when implicit or explicit public guarantees create interdependence among private 
investors, a move by one borrower that increases the likelihood of its own default 
increases the expected tax obligations of other borrowers, and by placing these funds 
abroad they escape increased tax payment.
4   
That aid contributes to the development process significantly is based on the 
assumption that in the absence of aid, investment rates would be lower. If it is assumed 
that the entire capital inflows are used only for investment purposes, then the foreign 
aid, on average, would have increased the growth rate by almost 20 percent. However, 
the assumption may not be tenable if foreign capital inflows result in a higher level of 
private and public consumption and, as such, the savings rate falls. [See Bhagwati 
(1970); Chaudhary and Hamid (1987); Griffin and Enos (1970); Mosley (1987) and 
Nabi and Hamid (1991)]. By regressing the savings rates against the foreign capital 
inflows along with other variables that affect the savings behaviour, it has been found 
that foreign capital inflows have entirely been used to finance consumption in Pakistan 
[Kemal (1997)]. The increase in foreign capital has resulted in lowering the savings by 
the same magnitude, and as such foreign aid may have contributed almost nothing to 
growth. Siddiqui and Malik (2002) estimate directly the impact of debt on growth rates 
and argue that debt accumulation and growth have a non-linear relationship.  Up to a 
certain level, the impact is positive; and beyond the threshold level, the relationship 
turns negative. While debt accumulation in other countries of South Asia so far has not 
had a negative impact on the growth rate, debt accumulation in the case of Pakistan is 
resulting in low growth.  
 
IV.  DEBT AND POVERTY 
Whenever a country is in a debt crisis, a large proportion of public 
expenditures and the foreign exchange earnings are absorbed by debt servicing. 
Increasing debt servicing requirements in the absence of debt relief leaves the 
following three choices to the governments of the debtor countries, viz., taxation of 
capital, taxation of consumption, and reduction in the public expenditures. Each of 
these has significant implications for an increase in the poverty rates. 
With a view to raising the public revenue to finance debt servicing, the 
government may increase the tax on capital and/or its incomes. This encourages 
capital flight
5 and the investment levels fall. A decline in the levels of investment 
 
4Eaton (1987) and Khan and Haque (1985) argue that there is an asymmetric risk of expropriation 
facing domestic and foreign investors. Domestic investors invest abroad and they finance their investments 
from borrowing abroad especially when the debt is guaranteed by the government. 
5Rogoff (1992) suggests that when the debt-GDP ratio is sufficiently large it cannot be paid in full; 
then the repayment of debt is a tax on the new investment. A. R. Kemal 
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results in reduction in the level of output, and the Okun law suggests that the 
employment would fall. The increase in unemployment to 7.8 percent in the recent 
years in Pakistan confirms this. Rising unemployment levels restrict the growth of 
nominal wage rates, resulting in declining real wage rates. This, together with the 
rising unemployment, implies the worsening functional income distribution. If we 
remember that the poor hold very little capital, this also implies deterioration in the 
size distribution of income as well. 
Whereas the trickle-down theory suggests that growth is sufficient and there is 
no special reason to go for pro-poor growth, Kakwani (2001) argues that whereas 
growth tends to reduce poverty, income inequality tends to increase the poverty 
levels, i.e., there is a trade-off between growth and income distribution. He calculates 
the growth rates of per capita GDP required if the gini coefficient increases by one 
percent to keep the poverty gap at the same level. This ratio changes from one 
country to another and ranges between 1.23 in the case of Korea to 4.07 in the case 
of Thailand.    
If the government decides instead to tax consumption, then it enlarges the tax 
net and the commodities used by the poor are also taxed, making the tax regressive. 
This impacts the poor sections of the society directly. 
The government may reduce the public expenditures. As long as it reduces the 
wasteful expenditures, it is good for the economy and the poorer sections of the 
society. However, the poor are hit directly—to the extent the development 
expenditure, social sector expenditure, and subsidies are reduced.   
Let us examine how Pakistan has financed the rising debt servicing over the last 
decade. Pakistan reduced the personal and corporate income taxes.
6 This led to an 
increase in the investment levels as long as Pakistan was pursuing consistent economic 
policies and the economy was being liberalised. However, because of the lack of 
continuity of policies by the successive governments and the rising debt burden, there 
has been a sharp fall in the investment levels despite the reduction in tax rates.  
The slow-down of investment has led to a reduction in the growth rate of GDP 
which has impacted poverty through inadequate employment generation. Compared 
to the growth of labour force at a rate of 2.4 percent, the expected growth rate of 
employment is in the range of only 1.5 percent,
7 thus adding 0.5 million persons 
annually to the ranks of the unemployed. The unemployment rate rose to 7.8 percent 
in 1999-2000.
8 Moreover, there has been a shift in the employment structure from 
 
6While the revenue from direct taxes as a proportion of total revenue is shown to have been rising, 
it is due to withholding taxes where they are the final payment. If these are excluded, then there is no 
increase in the proportion of direct tax revenue, which would be no more than 20 percent of total tax 
revenue.  
7With GDP growing at less than 4 percent and an employment elasticity of around 0.4 yields, 
employment is expected to grow at a rate of around 1.5 percent. 
8The unemployment rate for urban areas is higher than for rural areas. Similarly, teenagers and females 
suffer from a higher level of unemployment than the remaining categories. The Presidential Address 
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the industrial sector towards less productive sectors. Employment in the 
manufacturing sector declined from 14.2 in 1987-88 to 10.2 in 1997-98. This shift 
has also resulted in an increase in underemployment, contributing further to the 
poverty levels in the country. 
As a part of its Structural Adjustment Programme, Pakistan has significantly 
reduced the customs duties. As these were the major source of revenue, the result is a 
substantial fall in the tax revenue. The direct taxes were reduced in the hope that the 
action will stimulate the investment and production levels, but due to a number of 
factors mentioned in the preceding sections the investment, instead of rising, has 
fallen. Therefore, the entire burden of adjustment for raising the tax revenue fell on 
the sales tax and reduction in public expenditure. Not only was the sales tax net 
broadened; the sales tax rates were also rather high. 
How did this change-over from tariffs to sales taxes impact poverty? It may be 
underlined that because of widespread smuggling, most of the import duties on the 
consumer goods were redundant, and as such tariff rationalisation involving a decline 
in import duties did not result in a reduction in the prices of imported goods or their 
substitutes produced within the country.
9 On the other hand, extending the sales tax 
even to the goods having maximum weight in the consumption bundle of the poor—
and that too at a high rate—is expected to affect the poorer sections of the society 
adversely. A tax structure that was meant to be progressive has turned regressive. The 
tax burden of the poorest income group has increased by 3.8 percent, and that of the 
richer sections of the society has declined by 20.0 percent [PIDE (2001)].   
Despite the widening of the sales tax net and the high rates of the tax, the 
public revenues failed to rise. Accordingly, to create a space in the budget to meet 
the needs of debt servicing, public expenditures had to be reduced. The public 
expenditures did decline from 26.7 to 20.5 percent, but the decline was mainly 
observed in the development expenditure, which declined from 6.9 to 2.7 percent of 
GDP, and also particularly in the social sectors in the current budget.  
The decline in the development expenditure impacts poverty in three ways. 
First, it reduces the construction activities, which are the most labour-intensive 
activities, and thus tends to generate higher unemployment levels. Secondly, the 
private investment also tends to fall because the availability of the physical and 
social infrastructures is constrained. Thirdly, the decline in expenditure on social 
sectors such as education and health has a direct adverse impact on the poor.  
While debt servicing increased rapidly, both the development and the current 
subsidies have fallen rather sharply. Whereas total subsidies at constant prices show 
a modest growth from Rs 8151 million in 1990-91 to Rs 9116 million in 2000-01 at 
constant prices of 1990-91, most of these subsidies are provided to the loss-making 
public enterprise units. The poverty-related subsidies in fact declined from Rs 5257 
 
9The households may, however, indirectly benefit through increase in employment. A. R. Kemal 
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in 1990-91 million to just Rs 284 million by 2000-01, i.e., from 0.52 to 0.01 percent 
of GDP [Niazi (2001)]. 
It is therefore quite clear that in Pakistan the debt has impacted the poor 
through a reduction in the employment and wage rates, an increased tax burden, and 
a decline in subsidies.  
 
V.   OVERCOMING THE DEBT CRISIS 
The debt issue, however, is not just limited to Pakistan [Fischer (1987)]. Most 
of the developing countries face an acute debt problem which needs to be efficiently 
and equitably resolved. It is sometimes believed that only the writing-off or 
rescheduling of debt would be the end of the debt crisis. This is far from the truth. 
Debt crisis is not resolved until the debt situation is such that there is confidence in 
the country’s ability to service its debt over time under a reasonable range of 
economic conditions, and the debt burden must not leave the debtor in a state of 
long-term stagnancy [Fisher (1987)]. An efficient and pragmatic resolution of debt 
crisis, as pointed by Carmicael (1999), is one that stimulates investment and, through 
investment, economic growth; lowers protection; and helps institute reforms at both 
the macro economic level (especially fiscal restraint and sound management of 
exchange rates) and the microeconomic level (liberalisation of markets, removal of 
distortions). What should be the equitable resolution?  There are major differences, 
and there are judgmental issues regarding the distribution of burden amongst the 
developing, and industrial countries and the shareholders of the commercial banks. 
However, when a partial write-off would improve the capacity to pay off the debtor, 
then it is a Pareto optimal situation, where both the debtors as well as the creditors 
stand to gain.   
The four main ways of debt resolution include procedural reform, policy 
reform in debtor countries, increased investment in debtor countries, and forgiveness.  
  • Procedural reforms include multi-year debt rescheduling, reducing the size of 
banking syndicates, altering the accounting rules to allow debt write-offs, 
gradual amortisation, and helping the debtors in reducing the flight of capital.  
  • Policy reforms that can help the debt resolution are all sorts of macro 
policies that encourage savings and exports, and in this regard fiscal and 
exchange rate policies are crucial. However, implementation of such 
policies is not all that easy as it includes substantial reduction of 
consumption, especially of the very poor.  
  • While supply expansion can be more effective and less painful than the 
demand reduction as a means of servicing the external debt and restoring 
external balance, the debt overhang acts as an effective tax on investment, to 
the extent that the rewards of successful investment may accrue to the 
foreign creditors and as such it is difficult to implement. The Presidential Address 
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  • Bradley (1986); Sachs (1986) and Krugman (1988) suggest outright debt 
relief of varying magnitudes as it would be in the interest of both the lenders 
and the debtors. Using the debt Laffer curve one can determine the points 
where it will be better for the creditor to forgive the loan rather than insist 
on full repayment of debt. We may point out that at rather high levels of 
debt, the debtor countries are discouraged to take remedial actions. As a 
matter of fact, debt write-off can increase the capacity for repayments. 
Debt resolution may be market-based or through government intervention. 
The market mechanism allows the banks to trade what otherwise would be 
untradable debt and, as has been pointed out by Fischer (1987), there are at least ten 
different ways that it can be done. These include the development of secondary 
insurance and financial markets, indexed loans, contingent lending obligations, 
longer maturity debts, debt equity swaps, debt service in local currency, return of 
flight of capital, country funds, debt subordination and interest capitalisation. The 
interventionists, in general, believe that there should be a new international 
institution which links the debtors and the creditors.      
Whereas the debt of a highly indebted country can be sold at a discount,
10 
there is uncertainty of the amount which is expected to be paid after debt 
rescheduling. The amount at which the debt may be sold is the expected value of the 
probability distribution. When the debt obligation is reduced through write-offs, the 
capacity to pay might even increase. Krugman (1988) argues that the creditors may 
wish to forgive part of a country’s debt to increase the likelihood that it will repay 
what remains. The tradeoff can be improved by indexing repayments to the state of 
nature.  
Even if the Laffer curve type analysis does not qualify Pakistan for a debt 
write-off, the country does qualify for debt rescheduling. Pakistan approached 
the Paris Club for rescheduling of its public and publicly guaranteed debt and the 
request was granted in January 1999; the debt of 3 billion dollars was 
rescheduled over the July 1998 to December 2000 period.  Similarly, the 
commercial debt amounting to $927 billion was also rescheduled by the London 
Club. The Euro Bond of maturity over the 1999 to February 2000 period was 
rescheduled through a voluntary exchange with a single bond of extended 
maturity.  The terms to which debt rescheduling was agreed by the Paris Club 
included a grace period of 5 years, repayment period of ten years after the grace 
period, and the same rate of interest at which the original loan was lent. Pakistan 
also got another debt rescheduling for the year 2001. However, rescheduling was 
for a shorter period and was not consistent with Pakistan’s capacity to pay. 
Short-term debt rescheduling gave very limited breathing space and could hardly 
stimulate the investors.  
 
10The discount factor of the debt is the value of debt. A. R. Kemal 
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Rescheduling recently negotiated by the Government of Pakistan is distinctive 
in three ways. First, the entire bilateral debt of Consortium countries of $12.5 billion 
has been rescheduled. Secondly, the debt rescheduling has been for a longer period, 
i.e., 35 years repayment with 15 years’ grace period for IDA loan, and 25 years 
repayment with 5 years’ grace period for the others. Thirdly, it has not been just 
rescheduling; there has been re-profiling of the debt in such a way that it takes into 
consideration the country’s capacity to pay.  
Such a debt rescheduling is expected to impact Pakistan’s economy positively 
in a number of ways.  First, the agreement with the IMF culminating in the debt 
rescheduling over a longer period, hopefully, would improve the credit rating of 
Pakistan and help in the investment and growth process. Secondly, a sharp reduction 
in the external debt servicing provides fiscal space to pursue development work and 
the programmes that directly or indirectly impact the poor positively. Thirdly, it 
would allow the State Bank of Pakistan to pursue a monetary policy that stabilises 
the economy without squeezing the investment levels.  
While debt rescheduling would definitely help in the growth prospects and, 
resultantly, the employment and real wages may start rising and poverty is reduced, 
we must ensure that the debt crisis does not recur. We must ensure that the fiscal 
space is used for public investment and total savings and investments rise. Stagnant 
investment and savings levels imply that the future generations will face an even 
more acute problem of debt than has been experienced recently. That the government 
has recently increased the development expenditures is a good omen. A better 
investment climate with strong economic fundamentals is expected to result in higher 
levels of investment. It will be instrumental to not only stopping the capital flight but 
may also mean that the capital that has already left the country comes back. The 
stimulation of growth along with pro-poor policies will ensure that poverty levels 
start falling.  
   
VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
The preceding analysis shows that even though debt burden as a percentage of 
GDP of  Pakistan exceeds that of all the South Asian countries, it still is not so high 
as to qualify for a debt write-off. This implies that Pakistan has the capacity to 
service its debt. In this context, long-term rescheduling (to avoid illiquidity) through 
re-profiling of debt assumes great significance. However, we must ensure that the 
short-run gain is converted into long-run gain as well, and not into a long-run 
liability. Accordingly, the following ten major elements, outlined by Ahmed and 
Summers (1992), must be kept in view. 
  •  Systematic thinking is crucial to avoid bad lending decisions. 
  • There should be close monitoring of how loan proceeds are spent. 
  • Those opting out of the international financial system generally do worse. The Presidential Address 
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  • Good national policies are necessary for economic revival and access. 
  • Economic adjustments take time and sustainability of reforms should be 
taken into consideration. 
  • There is a compelling need for official action to overcome the free-rider’s 
problem through concerted lending and/or debt reduction. 
  • Without official action, debt problems fester with unfortunate consequence 
for both debtors and the creditors. 
  • Debt reduction is sometimes necessary but never sufficient to restore 
external viability.  
  • Building risk-sharing contingencies into financial contracts is much less 
costly than renegotiating contracts when things go wrong. 
  • External finance for investment that comes to low-income countries must 
come from official resources. 
   Appendices 
 
Annexure Table 1 
Profile of Domestic and External Debt 
(Rs billion) 
 1997-98  1998-99  1999-2000  2000-01 
Total Debt Servicing  278.3 343.1 353.9 325.0 
Total  Interest  Payment  191.6 220.1 256.8 237.1 
Domestic    160.1 178.9 206.3 178.8 
Foreign  28.7 38.0 44.9 50.5 
Explicit  Liabilities  2.8 3.2 5.6 7.8 
Repayment of Principal 
  (Including Repayment of Foreign Debt)  86.7  123.0  97.1  87.9 
Ratio of External Debt Servicing to      
Export  Earnings  55.4 35.3 36.5 37.4 
Foreign  Exchange  Earnings  34.9 23.6 23.4 23.3 
Ratio of Total Debt Servicing to      
Tax  Revenue  78.4 87.8 87.2 68.9 
Total  Revenue  64.8 73.2 65.9 57.0 
Total  Expenditure  43.9 53.0 47.6 49.5 
Current  Expenditure  52.5 62.7 55.0 49.3 
Source:  State Bank of Pakistan, Annual Report 2000-01. Annexure Table 2 
Trends in Balance of Payments 
(Million $) 
Years Exports  Imports  Trade  Balance  Remittances Current  Account  Deficit 
1987-88  4362 6919 2557 2013  1682 
1988-89  4634 7207 2573 1897  1934 
1989-90  4926 7411 2485 1942  1891 
1990-91  5902 8385 2483 1848  2171 
1991-92  6762 8998 2236 1468  1346 
1992-93 6782  10049  3267  1562 3688 
1993-94  6685 8685 2000 1446  1965 
1994-95 7759  10296  2537  1866 2484 
1995-96 8311  12015  3704  1461 4575 
1996-97 8096  11241  3145  1409 3846 
1997-98 8434  10301  1867  1490 1921 
1998-99  7528 9613 2085 1060  2429 
1999-00 8190  9602  1412  983 1143 
2000-01 8926  10195  1269  1087  508 
 Annexure Table 3 
Budgetary Deficit in Pakistan 
(as Percentage of GDP) 
Public Expenditures 
















1987-88 17.3  13.8  0.9  26.7  19.8  6.9  6.9  8.5  –1.6 
1988-89 18.0  14.3  0.7  26.1  19.9  5.0  6.2  7.4  –2.4 
1989-90 18.6  14.0  0.8  25.7  19.3  6.9  6.5  6.5  +0.4 
1990-91 16.9  12.7  0.8  25.7  19.3  4.6  6.4  8.7  –4.1 
1991-92 19.2  13.7  1.2  26.7  19.1  5.2  6.4  7.7  –2.5 
1992-93 18.0  13.3  0.1  26.0  20.3  5.9  5.7  8.0  –2.1 
1994-95 17.3  13.8  0.3  22.9  18.5  5.2  4.4  5.6  –0.4 
1996-97 15.6  13.2  –  22.0  18.5  6.6  3.5  6.4  +0.2 
1997-98 16.0  13.2  –  23.7  19.8  7.6  3.9  7.7  +0.1 
1998-99 15.9  13.3  –  22.0  18.6  7.4  3.4  6.1  +1.3 
1999-00 16.9  12.8  –  23.4  20.2  8.3  3.2  6.5  +1.8 
2000-01 15.7  12.8  –  20.5  18.8  6.8  2.7  5.2  +1.5 
Source: Economic Survey, 2000-01 and previous issues. 

















Afghanistan  Edible Oil  Sugar 
1990-91 8150.9  5256.6  64  148.6 788.3 1156.1 2140.9  312.0 
1991-92 8205.9  5259.7  64  128.4  3671.4 250.0 187.9  32.0 
1992-93 5177.3  3235.7  62  126.4  2324.9 100.0  –  – 
1993-94 5138.2  2999.4  58  142.3 483.2 175.0  –  – 
1994-95 3691.1  3331.3  90  521.6 443.9  44.0  –  – 
1995-96 10435.4 9181.5  88  537.7 7014.0  107.8  –  – 
1996-97 7588.2  6798.1  90  473.8  5864.7  –  –  – 
1997-98 6554.8  4897.6  75  464.1  4221.5  10.0  –  – 
1998-99 3992.5  3623.8  91  501.0  2072.9  60.0  –  – 
1999-00 14427.0 1555.9  11  474.0 1045.9  5.0  –  – 
2000-01 27706.1  671.5  3  638.5  0.0  20.0  –  – 
2001-02 20680.3 2244.5  11  638.5  1  50.0  –  – 
 
 Annexure Table 5 
Trends in Investment 










Share of Private 
Sector in Fixed 
Factor 
1987-88 17.3  15.8  8.5  7.4  46.5 
1988-89 18.3  16.7  8.7  8.0  48.2 
1989-90 18.2  16.6  8.0  8.6  51.7 
1990-91 18.5  17.0  8.3  8.7  51.3 
1991-92 19.9  18.4  8.7  9.7  52.7 
1992-93  20.6  19.0 9.0 10.0  52.5 
1993-94 19.4  17.8  8.3  9.5  53.6 
1994-95 18.3  16.8  8.2  8.6  51.3 
1995-96 18.7  17.1  8.1  9.0  52.5 
1996-97 17.7  16.2  6.8  9.4  58.0 
1997-98 17.1  14.5  4.9  9.6  66.2 
1998-99 15.0  13.3  5.3  8.0  60.2 
1999-00 15.0  13.4  5.3  8.1  60.4 
2000-01 14.7  13.1  5.6  7.5  57.3 
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